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Individual Justice in a Bureaucratic World
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.
The theme of this conference, "Abuse of Procedural Rights,"
connotes the affirmative misuse of the apparatus of procedure.
Procedural abuses include: assertion of frivolous claims, interposition
of frivolous defenses, unjustified protraction of litigation, efforts to
escape the preclusive effects of res judicata, and so on. The papers
and the discussion elaborate in detail these and other abuses of the
machinery of justice. I share concern over these abuses and join in
the efforts to identify and remedy them. However, any diagnosis
aimed at curing legal abuses should take into account the larger legal
and social context and potential negative consequences of remedial
efforts.
In considering this larger context, we should keep in mind the
types of litigation in which "procedural abuse" arises. Many abuses
occur in commercial disputes and other litigation between businesses.
Other abuses occur in litigation between individuals, for example, in
divorce litigation. However, we should be mindful that many forms
of conduct considered to be abuse of procedure arise in efforts by
individuals to obtain justice in disputes with bureaucracies.
"Bureaucracies" include government agencies whose functions
pervade the modem community: administration of public health care,
pensions, transportation, employment relationships, and so on. They
also include private bureaucracies: the levels of administration in
business corporations responsible for handling customer complaints in
disputes that cannot be resolved under the impetus of competitive
pressure. Such claims concern employment discrimination, injury
from harmful products, injury to the environment, employment and
retirement benefits, and the like.
I can speak from specific knowledge only about the situation in
the United States. However, discussions with colleagues familiar
with other legal systems indicate that similar problems are
encountered elsewhere. Thus, all countries with substantial
government bureaucracies are susceptible to bureaucratic oppression
of ordinary citizens. Widely expressed complaints concern arbitrary
enforcement by police and regulatory officials such as building and
safety inspectors, tax collection officials and other lower level
TULANE J. OF INTL & COMP. LAW
officials. Indeed, in some countries bureaucratic oppression takes the
form not only of arbitrary determinations and rulings but extortion
and solicitation of bribes. Similar problems arise in encounters
between large business corporations and ordinary citizens. I believe
that the leadership of most large business corporations sincerely
endeavors to have a company's officials deal fairly and honestly with
employees, customers and people residing in the vicinity of the
company's factory, mill or other operating facility. However, the
pressures and incentives at lower echelons often lead employees of
business corporations in the opposite direction.
In this country, many of our most difficult legal problems arise in
disputes between individual citizens and public and private
bureaucracies. Many illustrations can be drawn from decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States, a tribunal that hears only a
minute fraction of all the civil litigation in this country. One
important decision by the Supreme Court dealt with the burden of
proof in a claim of racial discrimination brought against private
employers, such as a hospital or a manufacturing company.' Another
important decision concerned the liability of a public agency
responsible for children's welfare when a child under its authority was
subjected to serious physical abuse by a vicious step-parent.2 Another
decision concerned the availability of a "good faith" defense to a
public official accused of arbitrarily procuring the dismissal of a
public employee.' Review of the appellate court decisions in our state
jurisdictions reveals similar controversies.
These cases are exceptional only in that they have survived
litigation, often expensive and protracted, before ascending to the
appellate courts. Many times this number of appellate cases are
resolved in the trial courts-usually by a decision adverse to the
individual. Moreover, this takes account only of civil cases. Every
criminal prosecution can appropriately be considered, at least from
one perspective, as a dispute between public bureaucracy and the
individual accused of a crime.
These kinds of disputes evoke the image of David versus
Goliath. Very often in such disputes the individual visualizes himself
as a "David," asserting a claim for personal justice against an
opponent with overwhelming financial and political resources. The
other party to the dispute does not visualize itself as Goliath, however.
1. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
2. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
3. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
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Most officials of most bureaucracies consider that they are only trying
to fulfill their responsibilities. When bureaucrats resist a claim in a
dispute with an individual, their doing so is, in their eyes, simply a
responsible rejection of an over-reaching claim.4 There is justification
for this attitude in many cases, complete justification in some cases,
because the unfortunate fact is that individuals sometimes believe
they have been wronged by the bureaucracy when they have simply
been dealt with according to the rules. Hence, in litigation by some of
the Davids, it is Goliath, more specifically lower level employees of
Goliath, who are suffering abuse of process. Partly for this reason,
when a dispute between an individual and a bureaucracy reaches the
litigation stage, both sides regard themselves as doubly aggrieved:
aggrieved in the first instance by what is perceived as disregard of
rights or obligations, and further aggrieved by intransigence in the
failed effort to resolve the dispute short of litigation.
As I suggest later on, in my opinion, serious and systematic
attention should be given to various means to ameliorate legal
disputes between individuals and bureaucracies. However, careful
analysis is required of the nature of various kinds of such disputes,
their statistical frequency, and the way in which they develop and
unfold, with awareness that the most serious difficulties may not
concern those who most loudly complain. In all law reform it is
important to be circumspect about the nature and magnitude of the
problems to which reform is to be addressed.
Unfortunately, in this country we have witnessed several
instances in which our legislative bodies have not been circumspect.
One conspicuous example of misconceived procedural reform is now
dying a welcome death. This was the Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990. In this legislation, Congress responded to what it believed were
serious problems of procedural abuse in the federal courts. In
particular, Congress thought that discovery was being abused and that
courts were unconcerned and unimaginative in dealing with these and
related abuses. Accordingly, Congress ordered that special
"experimental" procedures be introduced in some of the federal trial
courts. Among these experimental procedures were alternative
dispute resolution, expedited discovery, and limitations on discovery.
Ten different federal courts adopted various combinations of these
procedures and administered them over a period of several years.
However, when the experiment was completed, the one
conclusion which could be reached through evaluation was that it was
4. See Geoffrey Hazard, Authority in the Dock, 69 B.U. L. REv. 469 (1989).
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impossible to tell which "experiments" had any significant effect.'
The immediate problem with the experiment was that it had not been
established on scientific experimental principles. Specifically, no data
had been collected concerning how the ten courts had functioned
before introduction of the experiments, so that "before and after"
comparison was impossible. Nor was systematic data collected
comparing the patterns of caseflow among the ten courts during the
experimental period, even though it was obvious that there were
substantial differences among the courts. For example, one of the ten
was the Southern District of New York, a district notorious for the
high incidence of complex litigation in its docket. Hence, coherent
parallel comparison was also impossible. Finally, the courts
participating in the experiment were selected simply because they had
volunteered. It is a basic principle of social research that volunteer
subjects are likely to be different in undetected ways from the general
population.
Another risk in procedural reform is that reforms often proceed
on the basis of anecdotal information-conspicuous cases which often
are atypical. It is simplistic to construct stereotypes, perhaps as
simplistic as the story of David and Goliath. American legislators
seem particularly prone to such stereotyping and to undertake
modification of the rules of procedure on the basis of stereotypes.
Thus, despite the ineffectual experiment generated by the Civil Justice
Reform Act, described above, Congress has proceeded with reforms
uninformed even by poor experiments.
Within the last few years Congress has imposed special rules of
procedure for two different types of litigation, one type concerning
private bureaucracies, the other concerning the federal tax
administration. The reform addressed to private bureaucracies
concerns litigation under our Securities Act. Under the Securities
Act, stockholders can bring suit against a corporation and corporate
officers for losses in the stock market suffered as a result of
misleading financial information published by the corporation. There
has been much Securities Act litigation, particularly responding to the
5. The story of the experiment and the efforts to determine its effects is set forth in the
RAND Report and the Rdport of Federal Judicial Center. See JAMES S. KAKALiK ET AL., JUST,
SPEEDY AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM ACT (RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, 1996); JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN
EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFoRM
ACT (RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, 1996); Donna Stienstra et al., Report to the Judicial
Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case Management: A Study of the Five
Demonstration Programs Established Under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (Federal
Judicial Ctr., 1997).
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active stock markets of the last decade. Many business leaders have
contended that these claims are unjustified and are prosecuted simply
to create lawyers' fees. Congress assumed that these contentions
were correct, and hence determined that the securities litigation
typically was frivolous and designed to procure "blackmail"
settlement.6 Accordingly, legislation was adopted that altered the
burden of pleading on plaintiffs in this category of litigation.
The other recent procedural reform adopted by Congress
addresses litigation between taxpayers and the Internal Revenue
Service. As one can imagine, Congressional sympathy was in favor
of the taxpayers, including not only individuals but corporations.
Here, Congress assumed that the typical taxpayer was a "David" who
had been made into a long-suffering victim of bureaucratic
oppression. There is no question that the Internal Revenue Service
had from time to time acted abusively. However, it is a matter of
common knowledge-and certainly within the knowledge of people
familiar with the administration of the federal tax law-that many
taxpayers abuse the Government. Put simply, there are many, many
tax cheats, whose illegal conduct necessarily imposes costs on the rest
of us. The question therefore was necessarily one of proportion:
what is the extent of abuse by the tax bureaucracy, and what forms
does it take, compared with the measure of tax evasion by taxpayers
and their abuse of litigation to hide or postpone their tax obligations?
However, Congress made little inquiry into these circumstantial
details. Instead, its approach was to alter the burdens of proof in
favor of taxpayers and provided them with favorable rules concerning
litigation expenses.'
I do not wish to address the merits of these special provisions. I
simply note that in both instances Congress proceeded without
systematic evidence or inquiry concerning the incidence and
characteristics of these types of litigation between individuals and
bureaucracies. For all we know, and for all that Congress knew when
it enacted these special rules, the typical Securities Act claim was
well-founded, although it was also true that some such claims were
not well founded. Similarly, for all we know, and for all that
Congress knew, in most litigation between the Internal Revenue
Service and individual taxpayers, the taxpayers' positions are dubious
and in some instances ludicrous. The point is that it is easy but
6. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C.A. (1995) Pub. L. No.
104-67, 1995 HR 1058, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
7. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-
206 (1998).
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fallacious to generalize from exemplary cases. Indeed, many lawyers,
and not just common law lawyers, tend to think in terms of exemplary
cases. The more difficult task is to think in quantitative terms about
patterns of cases and variations on patterns.
In the modem legal world, a predominant pattern of legal
conflict is litigation between individuals and bureaucracies. Of
course, litigation between large business entities persists and is
salient, as does litigation between government agencies and large
business entities and other large private organizations. Legal disputes
continue to arise between individuals, for example disputes between
motorists, adjoining landowners, between landlords and tenants, and
small business venturers. However, parties to these kinds of disputes
are subject to significant economic constraint against litigation abuse.
The typical small stakeholder cannot afford to invest in the cost of
litigation, nor, in systems where the loser must pay the winner's costs
of litigation, can the typical small stakeholder afford to run the risk of
incurring that obligation. When the parties to a legal dispute are both
substantial bureaucracies, they usually have the resources to carry
through in protesting about abuse of procedure on the part of their
adversary, or at least to retaliate in kind. When the parties to disputes
are both individuals, neither side can afford to pay for very much "due
process." In countries where the contingent fee is permitted, such as
the United States, the contingent fee system makes only a limited
difference. This is because a plaintiff's lawyer cannot afford to invest
much time in a case unless the financial returns are likely to be
substantial.
In the modem legal world as it is evolving, however, an
important pattern of legal conflict is litigqtion between individuals on
one hand, including small merchants and tradesmen, and large
organizations on the other hand. The constraints of economics
generally do not operate properly in such situations. The individual
has relatively few resources and no incentive to invest in a claim
beyond its immediate value. The larger organization has larger
resources and typically is a "repeat player," i.e., a litigant with
incentive to deter other potential antagonists from pressing similar
claims. The litigation incentives of the parties are not symmetrical.'
This lack of symmetry in litigation incentives between an
individual and a bureaucracy creates serious difficulties in devising
8. This asymmetry and its implications are discussed in Marc Galanter, Why the
"Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv.
95 (1974).
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remedies for abuse of procedure. The general rules of procedure
broadly allow parties to commit resources to litigation as they see fit.
Substantial investment in litigation costs is routine and presumably
appropriate for an organization with large "repeat player" stakes. Yet
the same measure of investment in litigation costs is prohibitive for an
individual. The rules on party-and-party costs, whether the
"American" rule or the rule prevailing in most legal systems, do not
take this strategic disparity into account. The contingent fee system
which has evolved in the United States has certain benefits in this
respect but also has limitations, particularly in cases involving low
monetary stakes. Conspicuously, the reforms proposed in the Woolf
Report for England and Wales seem to take little account of this
dimension of the problem.9
Closer attention must be given to more liberal procedures for
"group litigation." One example is the class suit in the United States,
a procedure that has become both famous and infamous. Another is
litigation by public officials on behalf of specific groups of citizens.
An example in this country is the recent litigation against the tobacco
companies by the attorney general offices of various states. Another
example is sponsorship of litigation by political and civic
organizations, for example litigation by civil rights organizations such
as the NAACP. My colleague Michele Taruffo reports similar
developments in Europe, for example, through labor unions. The
common theme is to provide a better balance of procedural resources
between individuals and the various bureaucracies with which
individuals must interact in the modem era. Achieving a better
balance is a world-wide challenge.
9. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL
JUSTICE SYsTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES ch. 7 (1996) (Woolf Report).
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